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Volume 9, Number 12 (August 4, 2004) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch and Military 
Reform 
By Susan Cavan 
 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Reform commission 
President Vladimir Putin has signed a new decree on the reform of state 
administration. The decree creates a commission, to be chaired by Kremlin 
Chief-of-Staff Dmitri Medvedev, that includes presidential aides Viktor Ivanov 
and Igor Shuvalov, as well as reform-crusader Dmitri Kozak. (1) This decree 
appears to represent another link in the reform plan initiated in March (and 
strategized throughout 2003), although there is some speculation that it is a 
buttressing effort to address the failure of administrative reform thus far. (2) 
 
"Administrative rent" 
Commercial activity by state enterprises is coming under attack, apparently as 
part of the plan to curtail corruption. The businesses targeted are Federal 
State Establishments (FGUs) and Federal State Unitary Enterprises (FGUPs). (3) 
The total number of FGUs and FGUPs is estimated to be over 50,000. A 
commission, investigating the state-supported enterprise structure, has set 
about the task of reducing the number of companies receiving government 
money. Dmitri Kozak, Chief-of-Staff of the Government, is supervising the overall 
effort to cut the government flow of funds to these enterprises. (4) The first three 
sectors reported to be slated for reform are "land chambers," which survey and 
mark land, as well as set values for the parcels; security guard services, which 
have been embroiled in countless intra-services struggles and have intervened in 
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personal disputes between leading political figures; and, oddly, educational 
enterprises "engaged in training or retraining personnel."(5) 
 
This attempt at reform is intriguing in that it addresses several critical issues of 
the intertwined political and economic transition Russia underwent in the nineties. 
It is certainly aimed at reducing the opportunities for corruption in the state 
ministries and agencies that oversee the enterprises. This reform is seen as yet 
another swipe at "administrative rent" - a rarified term for extortion by public 
officials. (6)  
 
Those state officials who have been displaced already by administrative reform, 
however, are well-positioned to take advantage of the privatization of these 
structures. Izvestiya cites a former state official who claims that some 
(presumably other) former state officials "will attempt to take some revenue 
sources away from state control - and the state doesn't even know that these 
sources exist." (7) 
 
The choice of first targets appears as an eclectic mix that may have been chosen 
to alleviate the concerns of competing groups within the apparat. Weaning land 
valuation from state control will likely set up frenzied competition throughout the 
regions for oversight of the process. It may come to represent the next phase of 
millionaire-making reform. Former officials, current insiders and well-sourced 
regional competitors are the likely winners in any attempt to loosen federal 
control. 
 
The jettisoning of security guard services from state support may have two 
regime-friendly side effects: First, any officials hoping to use state resources to 
build a security force that could challenge centrally-controlled security services 
will be frustrated in their efforts. The list of entrepreneurs/political officials who 
have tried to immunize themselves from security service and police 
investigations through the contracting of private guard services is substantial. 
 3 
Eliminating state support for these services will facilitate state attempts to 
recentralize police and guards functions, while simultaneously closing off an 
attractive option for quasi-private employment by current members of the security 
organs, further buttressing the reimposition of hierarchical central authority. 
 
The decision to confront the state-private conflict in the sphere of education is 
unusual when considering the other potential areas of intervention, but less 
surprising given the proliferation of corrupt practices and the role of the central 
government in education in general. (8) From teachers' strikes, including a 
hunger strike for back pay that cost at least one life, to the "textbook murders" of 
1998, the state's education policy and the use of selective privatization has been 
controversial. More so than media policy, banking, the aluminum or oil 
industries? Hard to say. 
 
Rosneft protected 
Speaking of state intervention in industry, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kremlin 
Administration Igor Sechin has been appointed as Chairman of the board of 
Rosneft. While it has been clear that "petro-dollars" will be a critical element of 
Russian economic recovery and success, Sechin's appointment also solidifies 
further the government's direct involvement in protecting oil revenues and its 
intention to "exercise greater control over investment plans for the entire 
industry." (9) 
 
MILITARY REFORM 
Kicking Kvashnin 
Anatoli Kvashnin, former Chief of the General Staff and recently-minted Doctor of 
Military-Science, must be chagrined to witness how quickly his support dissipated 
in the face of presidential pressure for his resignation from the General Staff. (10) 
Despite attempts to showcase his expertise on the current state of the military 
and plans for its strategic development, this ultimate apparatchik-networker ran 
into a maze created by the Putin team, with all the life lines of bureaucratic 
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support dead ending in the center and exit available only at the bottom of a path 
requiring the ceding of authority to the new power player, Putin’s own Sergei 
Ivanov. (11) 
 
Kvashnin’s resignation from the Genshtab, and retreat from military service in 
general, has let loose an apparently pent-up swell of disdain. "Most senior 
officers…welcome Kvashnin’s resignation. (…) [They] undoubtedly remember the 
series of senseless organizational changes, mergers and splits…initiated by 
Kvashnin, who was given to using all these tactics to get rid of anyone he viewed 
as a rival." (12) 
 
Previously, disgruntled Generals have left an administration’s service and gone 
on to enter politics through the Duma, and, in one remarkable instance, to rally 
support, one military base at a time, for reform and full financing of the military’s 
needs, Kvashnin has seen similar options narrow for himself with each attack in 
the press. He may yet have support and good will among servicemen and 
citizenry, but can it be sustained through the blame game that is following his 
departure? 
 
"Kvashnin sent his troops into the Chechen capital, Grozny, on New Year’s Eve 
[1994]. The attack disintegrated into a disastrous, bloody failure….He is largely to 
blame for the military’s defeat by Chechen rebels in 1996. He was a primary 
instigator of the present Chechen campaign, which has devolved into a quagmire 
with no end in sight. The strategy of employing unlimited firepower, carrying out 
reprisals against the civilian population and stubbornly refusing to seek a political 
solution…before rebel incursions into Dagestan and terrorist bombings of 
apartment buildings gave the Kremlin an excuse to restart the conflict in 
Chechnya. The full laundry list of Kvashnin’s blunder is too long to include here." 
(13) 
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Kvashnin’s downfall, so roundly celebrated with even an abbreviated enunciation 
of his crimes and the consequent attacks on his military record (he was a "suit") 
has proven, at least thus far, to be an unexpectedly efficient method of 
delegitimizing a once-unquestioned military authority. And a much neater solution 
than the Rokhlin scenario. (14) 
 
Source Notes 
 
(1) Novye Izvestiya, 19 Jul 04; What the Papers Say(WPS) via ISI Emerging 
(2) Markets database. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Izvestiya, 21 Jul 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets database. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) For an analysis of the conflicts in teaching history in the post-Soviet 
environment, see "Revised…again: The Politics of History," by Janet Vaillant, 
Perspective, Vol. XIV, No. 4 June/July 2004 
(10) "A Russian Star is Born," by Chris Weafer (Chief strategist for Alfa Bank), 
Prime TASS, 28 Jul 04 via ISI Emerging Markets database. 
(11) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 Jul 04, pp. 1-2; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(12) See previous NIS Observed for a discussion of Kvashnin’s attempts to 
circumvent the presidential storm as it moved in to clean him out of office. 
(13) Vremya novostei, 20 Jul 04, p.1; WPS via ISI Emerging markets Database. 
(14) The Moscow Times, 20 Jul 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(15) General Lev Rokhlin, a Duma Deputy and critic of the Yel’tsin regime, was 
allegedly shot by his wife while he slept in their dacha outside of Moscow in July 
1998. In May 2004, the court case against Rokhlin’s wife was postponed 
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indefinitely due to the ill health of the couple’s son, Igor, and of the defendant 
herself. (RIA-Novosti, 28 May 04 via Lexis-Nexis.) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Incompetence theory 
A month ago, Chechen rebels carried out a successful raid into Ingushetia. (1) 
Despite allegations of foul play, made by Ingush President Murat Zyazikov, the 
indications in the days and weeks that followed were that the incursion was made 
possible by sheer incompetence and intelligence failures on the part of the 
Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service. The incompetence theory was 
lent further credence by a Kommersant story, which revealed that the FSB’s 
"seek and destroy" squads had killed the wrong individual in retribution for the 
raid, possibly in order to cover up the agency’s failings. (2) 
 
Since the raid, there has been a flurry of activity relating to changes in the 
security apparatus. The Russian press has been quick to paint these changes as 
fallout from the Nazran incident, and to state that they have come about because 
President Putin experienced "enlightenment" during a recent visit to Ingushetia. 
(3) The one Western media outlet which has covered the story, The Economist, 
has been similarly quick to praise Putin’s actions, arguing that they herald a 
much-needed reform of Russia’s security and military services, returning security 
functions to civilian control. (4) But do the changes being made substantiate The 
Economist’s argument? 
 
FSB "reforms" 
On 14 July, President Putin decreed changes in the FSB. One of Nikolai 
Patrushev’s deputies, Anatoli Yezhkov, who was in charge of the North 
Caucasus region, was removed from his post. The decree also ordered 
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Patrushev to reduce the number of his deputies from twelve to four. (5) Most 
importantly, the decree granted the FSB full Ministry status, giving Patrushev and 
his deputies equivalent salaries, social benefits and healthcare as other 
ministers. (6) Finally, the decree allowed the FSB to reform itself. Patrushev will 
be required to submit reform proposals to President Putin in 90 days time. (7) 
However, these are the only portions of the decree that have been released by 
the President’s Press Service. Most of the decree remains highly classified. The 
secrecy surrounding the FSB’s "reform" has fuelled speculation as to what will 
happen to the security service by the end of this year. 
 
According to the Center for Current Political Research, by year's end the FSB will 
begin to subsume and take over the functions of the SVR (Foreign Intelligence 
Service) and the FSO (Federal Guards Service), Russia’s equivalent of the US 
Secret Service. (8) Gazeta, supporting this forecast, states that according to its 
sources the new agency will be called MGB (Ministry for State Security), a name 
that is reminiscent of Stalinist terminology. (9) Such speculation has been rife for 
some time, as witnessed by articles in Versiya and Yezhenedelnyi Zhurnal in 
April and May 2004, (10) and the idea of a coming ‘super ministry’ is lent more 
credibility by the report, carried by Itogi, but ignored by the mainstream press, 
that the FSB already has absorbed some sections, if not all, of the Federal 
Agency for Government Communications (FAPSI). (11) The idea that one 
ministry is being created is validated further by contrasting the secrecy 
surrounding the FSB’s "reform" with the transparency given to the reforms in the 
Interior Ministry. 
 
MVD reforms 
The Interior Ministry has been threatened with reform for some time. On 26 
March this year, Putin addressed MVD officers, warning that the Ministry had to 
change or face forced change. (12) At the time, it was unclear whether the MVD 
would be disbanded and subsumed into the FSB, or whether the Ministry would 
remain, albeit considerably weakened. It now appears that the MVD’s time to 
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change has run out, and that reforms will be imposed from above. Two MVD 
Generals, Vyacheslav Tikhomirov and Mikhail Labulets, respectively 
Commander-in-Chief of MVD Troops and North Caucasus Commander were 
removed from their posts. (13) Then on 19 & 20 July, as he had done earlier with 
the FSB, President Putin signed into effect decrees enforcing major changes.  
Thus, the Federal Migration Service will be removed from the MVD’s portfolio, 
and established as a stand-alone organization headed by Andrei Chernenko, 
who until now has been a deputy to Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev. (14) 
Moreover, the decree, in a move that had been anticipated, (15) removes 
investigative functions from the MVD, and establishes a Federal Investigation 
Service, whose Director has not yet been selected. The Ministry also will lose 10 
percent of its personnel, and half its directorates will be cut. Meanwhile crime-
fighting will be moved from the Federal to the local level: the directorates will no 
longer carry out field-work, but will be reorganized to perform administrative and 
managerial tasks. (16) Finally, in line with reforms in other power ministries, 
Nurgaliyev is to reduce the number of his deputies to only four. (17) These 
changes indicate that a decision has been made at the highest level to leave the 
MVD as a weakened Ministry rather than incorporating it fully into the FSB. 
 
Conclusions reached both by The Economist and Novaya gazeta reporters, that 
Putin has experienced "enlightenment", or that "civilian" control of the FSB 
means improvement for Russian democracy should be viewed with extreme 
skepticism. They ignore the reality that the siloviki are close to the President, as 
staffers, advisers, and, apparently, friends as well as the ever broadening sphere 
of authority granted to the FSB as an organization. Moreover the idea that these 
"reforms" are the result of the Nazran incursion ignores preexisting evidence of 
Putin’s desire to consolidate the power of the security services. 
 
The creation of a "super agency" would be a step back towards Soviet times, 
when massive power was concentrated in the hands of one secretive agency. 
Whether a Ministry for State Security emerges as an organization or is only 
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conjured by fears of such a return, its possible creation must surely be observed 
with consternation. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume IX, Number 11 (15 Jul 04). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Novaya gazeta, 22 Jul 04; WPS-Defense and Security via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(4) The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 23 Jul 04; EIU Politics-News Analyst 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(5) Argumenty i fakty, 21 Jul 04; WPS-What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(6) Rossiiskie vesti, 22 Jul 04; WPS-What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(7) Prime-TASS, 14 Jul 04; Prime-TASS Newswire via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(8) Center for Current Political Research, 25 Jul 04; CCPR Russia Federal 
Politics via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(9) Gazeta, 14 Jul 04; WPS-Russian Political Monitor via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(10) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume IX, Number 8 (12 May 
04). 
(11) Itogi, 20 Jul 04; WPS-Defense and Security via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(12) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume IX, Number 6 (8 Apr 04). 
(13) Novaya gazeta, 22 Jul 04; WPS-Defense and Security via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(14) Center for Current Political Research, 25 Jul 04; CCPR Russia Federal 
Politics via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(15) Ibid. 
 10 
(16) The Moscow Times, 19 Jul 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(17) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Maolmordha McGowan 
 
An Exercise in Semantics 
On Friday, 30 July, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution threatening 
possible punitive measures against the Islamic government of Sudan if it does 
not take action to disarm and prosecute Arab militias within 30 days. (1) The 
militias (janjaweed, meaning, "a man on a horse with a gun") have been 
supported by the government, at least tacitly, as they push black Sudanese off 
their lands, killing perhaps 50,000 and displacing over a million in the western 
region of Darfur. This resolution was designed to strengthen a 3 July Joint 
Communique, signed by the Sudanese government and U.N. Secretary General 
Kofi Annan, in which Sudan committed to cracking down on the janjaweed within 
90 days. (2) 
 
The resolution, passed 13 — 0 (Pakistan and China abstaining), was weaker 
than one originally sought by the United States and the European members of 
the Council, who wanted to threaten Sudan with specific political and economic 
sanctions should it ignore the call to disarm the militias. 
 
During initial negotiations on the new resolution, Russia expressed disapproval of 
a specific threat of sanctions. (3) After the U.S. draft resolution had been 
circulated at the U.N. for over a week, Russian Assistant Foreign Minister Yuri 
Fedotov publicly declared Moscow’s opposition, characterizing it as redundant, 
hence unnecessary. "We are proposing that the Sudanese government should 
be given a short but sufficient time to carry out its commitments," he said, 
referring to a 90 day deadline, which would give Sudan until November to 
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comply. Fedotov considered the sanctions issue irrelevant, since threatening 
definite consequences "should be put off until after it becomes clear how the 
agreements between General Secretary Kofi Annan and the Sudan government 
are being carried out." (4) The word "sanctions" was eventually replaced by a 
reference to Article 41 of the U.N. Charter which outlines the possible actions 
available to the Security Council should a resolution go unfulfilled, which, of 
course, includes sanctions. (5) 
 
The Sudanese cabinet, naturally, sought to capitalize on the disagreement within 
the Security Council by using Russia’s reasoning to reject the Security Council 
resolution in favor of the 90 day commitment. (6) But why would Russia spend a 
week stalling and debating semantics while threatening to veto the resolution if it 
contained the threat of sanctions? 
 
Now would be a good time 
Perhaps because Russia’s state-controlled military aircraft supplier MiG still had 
two MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters to send to Sudan to fulfill a 12 aircraft, $200 million 
contract. The agreement was signed by the Sudanese government in 2001 and 
was due for complete delivery by December 2004. (7) The Russian media 
reported that the Sudanese government had asked to receive the warplanes 
before the 50th anniversary celebration of the People’s Armed Forces on 14 
August, and MiG was more than happy to oblige. (8) 
 
Consequently, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, noting 
Sudan’s inclusion on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and its role in the 
ongoing violence in Darfur, declared that the U.S. views the matter with "great 
concern…the United States opposes all arms transfers to Sudan." Furthermore, 
he stated that any arms transfers "to a state sponsor of terrorism is sanctionable 
under U.S. laws." (9) 
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Further criticism followed from human rights groups, such as Amnesty 
International, which expressed concern that the MiGs might be used against 
civilians, since "militia members may be integrated into government forces," (10) 
and that there have been reports of government forces bombing native villages in 
Darfur. (11) 
 
Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was left to deal with the ensuing public 
relations debacle. Spokesman Aleksander Yakovenko said that the delivery "is in 
no way linked to the recent events in and around Sudan," since the agreement 
was signed in 2001, before the violence in Darfur erupted. Russian officials and 
defense experts argued that the MiGs would not be useful against either the 
Darfur civilians or against a Western humanitarian intervention. (12) 
 
Russia’s argument on this matter is half-convincing. Amnesty International’s 
concern that the warplanes might be used against civilians in the Darfur region is 
questionable. While the MiG-29 can carry air-to-surface munitions, it has a low 
munitions load capacity and would be of little use in the sort of carpet bombing 
that might be used against the villages in Darfur. Its primary function is as an air 
superiority fighter, used to clear the skies of enemy fighters and pave the way for 
slower, more vulnerable bombing aircraft. (13) These fighters would be of more 
use against, say, Egypt, with which Sudan has fought border skirmishes (14) and 
which also has over 100 U.S.-made F-16s, a comparable air superiority fighter. 
(15) Thus, the Foreign Ministry can argue that the equipment was not intended 
for use against Darfur civilians. 
 
It is much less convincing that delivery was rushed so the fighters would be 
available for a military parade. At the time of the delivery, the U.S. House of 
Representatives was quickly pushing through a resolution describing the 
situation in Darfur as genocide and urging the administration to take action, using 
multilateral or unilateral force to end the violence if necessary. The final two MiG-
29s were delivered a day before that resolution was passed unanimously, and 
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two days before the U.S. administration drafted the U.N. Security Council 
Resolution threatening sanctions. (16) Sudan has threatened to defend itself if 
the West were to intervene, and the MiG-29s would be quite useful for defending 
against bombers. Sudan wanted the aircraft to arrive before any arms sanctions, 
and MiG wanted Sudan’s payment to anticipate economic sanctions. 
 
The MFA could have been spared this problem, had recently-appointed MiG 
Director General Valeri Toryanin simply shuttled the planes to Sudan quietly. 
Instead, Toryanin chose to ring in the occasion with fanfare and full media 
coverage, calling a public meeting, tour and press conference at the Lukhovitsy 
MiG factory with the Sudanese ambassador. He proudly stated out that the early 
delivery "might lead to other agreements." Ambassador Chol Deng Alaq was 
quite receptive, noting Sudan "needs Russian aircraft… moreover, we can pay." 
(17) 
 
Toryanin seized the opportunity to boast that MiG’s foreign arms deals equaled 
over $1.4 billion, and had the potential to reach $2.0 billion for the year, saying 
Sudan was "the 29th country to which the MiG aircraft have been supplied…and 
we’re not stopping there." (18) Perhaps Toryanin was trying to move up on 
Putin’s list of favorite bureaucrats, since the Russian president has criticized 
Russian arms exporters for falling short of revenue targets. Toryanin may have 
been itching also to point out that, since his appointment to head MiG last year, 
MiG’s noted under-performance has been turned around. Before signing the 
$200 million contract with Sudan, MiG was suffering through a difficult period 
when only 25% of its export goals were met (19) as it struggled to sell off 200 
MiG-29s warehoused since the fall of the Soviet Union. (20) 
 
Though the MFA certainly would have preferred Toryanin finish the delivery 
discretely, the Kremlin repeatedly has demonstrated its willingness to accept 
momentary headaches in the interest of long-term profits. Delivering on a 
contract despite facing an inevitable conflict with the U.S., Europe, U.N. and 
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human rights groups says something about Russia’s and MiG’s reliability vis-à-
vis the kind of governments [read China, Myanmar and Yemen (21)] in the 
market for Russian hardware, especially as MiG attempts to close a 50-craft deal 
with Algeria. (22) 
 
Whether due to ignorance or indifference, Russia’s foreign policy and its 
diplomats at the MFA probably were the last thing on Toryanin’s mind when he 
gloated about an action that defied the international community. However, if the 
Kremlin continues to run effective interference for its arms exporters, his 
assertion that "today we can deliver any number of aircraft to any country" will 
continue to ring true, leaving the MFA to handle damage control. (24) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) U.N. News Centre, 30 Jul 04 via 
(http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11507&Cr=sudan&Cr1=). 
(2) The Economist, 31 Jun 04 via 
(http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=S%27%298H%2A
P1%3F%26%200%20%2C%0A). 
(3) Agence France-Presse, 28 Jul 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Agence France-Presse, in ibid. 
(5) The Economist, in ibid. 
(6) Reuters, 1 Aug 04 via 
(http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsPackageArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=5
57465&section=news). 
(7) Interfax, 21 Jul 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Vremya novostei, 22 Jul 04; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) U.S. State Department Press Release, 22 July 04 via 
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/34628.htm#sudan). 
(10) Amnesty International Press Release, 30 Jul 04 via 
(http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR540922004?open&of=ENG-SDN). 
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(11) Agence France-Presse, 16 Jul 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) St. Petersburg Times, 27 Jul 04 via 
(http://www.sptimesrussia.com/archive/times/989/news/b_13129.htm). 
(13) Global Security Defense Information Database via 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-29.htm). 
(14) Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 Aug 95 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) Global Security Defense Information Database via 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16.html). 
(16) Reuters, 23 Jul 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(27) Vremya novosti, in ibid. 
(18) RTR TV, 1300 GMT, 21 Jul 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(19) Vremaya novosti, in ibid. 
(20) Moscow Times, 27 Jul 04 via 
(http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2004/07/27/008.html). 
(21) Moscow Times, 2 Jun 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(22) Moscow Times; 22 Jul 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(23) Moscow Times, 27 Jul 04 in ibid. 
(24) RIA Novosti, 22 Jul 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
LEGISLATURE 
Reform vs. revolution 
The State Duma has been busy of late amending, and re-amending, 
government-proposed legislation that would provide monetary payments instead 
of social benefits to a population that clearly is unprepared for a substantial level 
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of governmental and societal reform. After weeks of debate and protest, the 
government resigned itself to making meaningful revisions. 
 
Reaction across the board was loud after the revolutionary compensations bill 
passed the first reading on 2 July, reminding legislators that reform is wanted, 
provided it doesn’t impinge on anyone’s notion of entitlements. By 14 July, Duma 
committees had staked out joint positions of support for 14 amendments to the 
compensations bill. (1) The following week, the chairman of the Duma’s 
committee on labor and social policy declared that the legislation would be 
"socialized considerably" for the second and third readings, scheduled for the 
first week in August. (2) Indeed, a member of the Duma’s public relations 
department explained that over 1,200 amendments had been proposed. (3) 
 
Eventually, the government had to admit that its attempt at what could have been 
drastic social reform was less than a blazing success. The trade unions, regional 
leaders and the Federation Council were particularly vocal in opposition, noting, 
for example, the additional burden expected to be placed on already-sagging 
regional budgets. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health and Social 
Development, therefore, reportedly reshaped the legislation substantially before 
the second reading. (4) Much of that remodeling involves concessions to long-
held expectations of government handouts. Health and Social Development 
Minister Mikhail Zurabov explained that, in the revised version, an increase in the 
guaranteed social package — which includes free health care, spa visits and 
transportation — would be mandatory for everyone receiving in-kind benefits 
through 2005, whereupon they would be able to choose between in-kind benefits 
and monetary compensation. (5)  
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Zyuganov emerges, again 
Gennadi Zyuganov has proven once more that he is the leader of the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), overcoming opposition to his rule, and 
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exacting retribution in a somewhat reserved manner — at least for those persons 
he still needs. Last month Zyuganov faced a major challenge from within his 
party on the eve of the KPRF Congress, as opponents, led by Ivanovo Oblast’ 
Governor Vladimir Tikhonov, gathered and held a rival Congress at the same 
time. This schism looked serious for a time, but Zyuganov has emerged 
victorious, while most of Tikhonov’s leading supporters have been removed from 
positions where they could pose a further threat. 
 
State Duma Deputy (and first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the 
party) Aleksandr Kuvayev was an early casualty, released from his party post in 
a plenary meeting attended by Zyuganov himself; notably the meeting did not, 
however, accede to the demand to remove him from the party altogether. (6) 
Three of the heads of regional branches identified with the opposition, Vladislav 
Yurchik (Krasnoyarsk), Alevtina Aparina (Volgograd) and Vasili Kislitsyn (Kurgan) 
were, in effect, pardoned for admitting their mistake. Bryansk Governor Yuri 
Lodkin also apparently saw the error of his ways and has gone back into the fold. 
Two others, Kamchatka Governor Mikhail Mashkovtsev and Nikolai Benediktov 
(Nizhni Novgorod) resigned. (7) Most of the others had only a short wait to learn 
their fate: The following weekend, the first and second secretaries of the 
Smolensk party committee were ousted; two deputies of Tatar Republic Party 
First Secretary Aleksandr Saliy followed him out of the door; and Kaliningrad City 
Party Committee leader Vladimir Shevchenko was ejected. (8) 
 
At this point, it is clearly a rebellion that failed. Tikhonov’s party has suspended 
active operations, and is seeking rapprochement with Zyuganov’s side. 
Zyuganov has not indicated in any way that he’s feeling merciful, however.  
 
ELECTIONS 
The farce that wasn’t funny: ‘Against All’ narrowly loses 
It was a bad day for Viktor Cherepkov, and a worse day for democracy in 
Vladivostok: After a near-successful assassination attempt, (which landed 
 18 
Cherepkov, the main rival to front-runner Vladimir Nikolayev, in the hospital with 
a concussion and heart problems); rampant allegations of intimidation and other 
nefarious tactics; and a recommendation from Central Election Commission 
Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov that voters should consider supporting "Against 
All" in the polling, Nikolayev was declared the winner of the Vladivostok mayoral 
elections held on 18 July. 
 
The race was bloody, both literally and figuratively. As Cherepkov was leaving 
his election headquarters on the night of 10 July, a grenade exploded; he ended 
up in the intensive care unit of Pacific Fleet hospital, suffering from a concussion, 
and heart attack, and loss of hearing. According to Andrei Selyutin from 
Cherepkov’s headquarters, the grenade attack was related to the impending 
second round of elections in which Cherepkov was due to face off against 
Nikolayev, who had garnered 26.8 percent of the vote, just 0.4 percent more than 
Cherepkov, in the first round. "Cherepkov has been intimidated verbally before, 
and now physical intimidation has begun," Selyutin charged. (9) 
 
While Cherepkov was in the hospital, Vladivostok's Leninsky district court 
annulled his registration for the election on the basis of charges that he had 
abused his office as State Duma Deputy in running his campaign. (10) Yet the 
court’s decision was controversial, as well. A doctor from the hospital where 
Cherepkov was being treated had testified that he was able to attend the 
proceedings two days after the blast, an assertion that was subsequently denied 
by the head of the hospital, who said it would be days before the deputy could be 
questioned about the blast, much less defend himself in court. (11) The court 
accepted the first doctor’s testimony, however, and issued a decision before 
Cherepkov could appear. 
 
The court’s actions were no less suspect than those of the police, who instituted 
criminal proceedings based on the assumption of hooliganism. (12) No suspects 
have been identified as yet in the grenade explosion. 
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The court’s decision evoked a strong reaction by Veshnyakov, who called it "an 
abuse by law." He warned that the "ruling may insult the voters and thwart the 
election," and noted that the campaign would have to start again if the majority of 
voters rejected all candidates. His suggestion was seconded by the incumbent 
mayor, Yuri Kopylov, who had finished third in the first runoff and so was in line 
to replace Cherepkov in the second round. Kopylov refused to participate, 
protesting Cherepkov’s exclusion and urging his supporters to vote "against all 
candidates." (14) Kray Deputy Aleksandr Perednya, the fourth-place finisher in 
the first round, also refused to run. (15) Both alleged regional authorities’ 
involvement in campaign irregularities in favor of Nikolayev, a businessman who 
was amnestied after being convicted of assault and attempted murder. (16) "My 
decision to become head of Vladivostok City remains in force. But the only way 
of achieving this democratically is to put an end to the election farce and then to 
hold an election with a truly free expression of city inhabitants’ will," Perednya 
said. (17) Yet a challenger was found, in the form of fifth-place finisher Nikolai 
Markovtsev. And that ensured that elections would be held. 
 
When all was said and done, though, Veshnyakov and others were bound by the 
election laws they touted: A turnout of roughly 38 percent surpassed the 
minimum required, Nikolayev received the majority of the vote (more than 50 
percent) against his challenger, and no official complaints about the execution of 
the elections were received. (18) Still, "against all" had a fairly good showing, 
with 38 percent of the vote. 
 
The media response was immediate, with many decrying what they called a 
victory for the "criminal world" and charging the kray administration with 
orchestration of Nikolayev’s election win. (19) Allegations were made that more 
voters selected "against all" than was apparent in the official results, but these 
could not be proved. (20) In the end, the results remained the same. "The will of 
citizens was expressed very clearly in these elections," Veshnyakov said, adding 
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that voters could have chosen an alternative candidate or "against all." (21) He 
added that he might seek introduction of legislation that would mandate the 
reporting even of cancelled convictions by election candidates in the future. 
 
In the meantime, democracy is in shaky hands. The increase in the popularity of 
"against all candidates" has one positive note, in that voters at least appear to 
feel that their voices can be heard. But that one positive note is outweighed by 
the ever-growing realization that no one is listening. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ITAR-TASS, 1607 GMT, 14 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0714 via World News 
Connection. 
(2) ITAR-TASS, 1425 GMT, 21 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0721 via World News 
Connection. 
(3) ITAR-TASS, 1955 GMT, 20 Jul 04: FBIS-SOV-2004-0720 via World News 
Connection. 
(4) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0721 via World News 
Connection. 
(5) ITAR-TASS, 1900 GMT, 26 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0726 via World News 
Connection. 
(6) Interfax, 1744 GMT, 13 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0713 via World News 
Connection. 
(7) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0715, and Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 19 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0719 via World News Connection. 
(8) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0719 via World News 
Connection. 
(9) ITAR-TASS, 2106 GMT, 9 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0709 via World News 
Connection. 
(10) Interfax, 1028 GMT, 12 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0712 via World News 
Connection. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
BELARUS 
Lukashenko’s ten years in office 
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July 20, 2004 marked the 10th anniversary of Lukashenko’s inauguration. The 
Belarusian president held a four-hour question and answer session, which was 
broadcast live on Belarusian national radio. Lukashenko considers "a peaceful 
Belarus" to be his main achievement of the past ten years, which is apparently 
sufficient to change the constitution and run for a third term. When asked by a 
BBC correspondent about his plans to run for president again, Lukasheko 
assured him that he would ask the permission of the nation before doing that. 
"…We will need a referendum," he said, "and at that referendum, the people will 
need to say Yes, Lukashenko, we allow you to stand in these presidential 
elections. Everything will be according to the Constitution, everything will be 
honest and orderly. It will be beautiful. I guarantee you that," continued 
Lukashenko. (1) The president also added rather confidently that the nation 
needs not to worry, as the necessary legislation could be produced quickly. 
 
The day of Lukashenko’s 10th anniversary in office was marked by opposition 
protests, which, according to different sources, attracted anywhere from 150 to 
5,000 persons. A correspondent from the RTR Russia channel Dmitry Petrov 
reported that between 2,000 and 5,000 persons participated in the anti-
presidential rally, which was the largest of the year (2) — a statement to which 
the Belarusian authorities reacted sharply, claiming that the correspondent was 
transmitting false information about events in Belarus. The Belarusian authorities 
say that the opposition protest rally was "a failed event" and had not attracted 
more than 150 persons. (3) The "biased information" offended Lukashenko so 
deeply that he decided to close the RTR Russian station in Belarus, which 
provoked a harsh reaction from the Russian side. Russian Foreign Minister, 
Aleksandr Yakovenko, said that the coverage of the events in Belarus could not 
be considered as serious grounds for closure of the channel’s news bureau in 
Minsk. (4) 
 
Meanwhile, the Belarusian authorities seem to be unable to keep their count of 
the rally's participants straight. Right after the rally, the Belarusian Interior 
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Ministry announced that around 800 persons had taken part in the event in Minsk 
— a number substantially higher than 150. It appears that the Interior Ministry 
had not obtained the information about the "correct" number of participants in 
time and made a hasty judgment, but, apparently, the estimate was still not low 
enough for the authorities. An independent Belarusian news agency Belapan 
estimated that around 4,000 persons took part in the anti-presidential rally. (5) 
 
This is not the first time, that a Russian media source has been closed. A year 
ago, the Russian NTV station was closed in Minsk due to its critical coverage of 
local politics. 
 
MOLDOVA 
"A political dimension of the humanitarian issue" 
It has been three weeks since the beginning of a political and humanitarian battle 
between Tiraspol authorities and several Moldovan-language schools in 
Transdniestr. The administration of Igor Smirnov ordered the closure by 
September of all Moldovan-language schools in Transdniestr that use Latin 
script. In order to reopen, these schools will have to register with the Transdniestr 
authorities and switch from Latin script to Cyrillic. (6) 
 
As a reaction to the demands of the Dniestr authorities, teachers, students and 
parents barricaded themselves inside the schools and refused to leave the 
buildings in order to avoid the school property being seized. The schools have 
had their water, gas and electrical services cut off and energy providers have 
cancelled their contracts with them. There are 1,600 students enrolled and 80 
teachers employed in Alexandru cel Bun lyceum in Tighina. The school 
administration said that Dniestr authorities have cancelled the 10-year rent 
contract with the school, and the children have nowhere to go. (7) On 26 July, 30 
Dniestr policemen rushed into the facilities of the Moldovan boarding school for 
orphans in Bender, while 320 children were in summer camps. It is not clear 
where these children will live when they return from their vacation. (8) 
 24 
 
Six schools teaching in Moldovan with Latin script were closed. None of these 
schools is registered, accredited or licensed in the Dniestr region. The schools 
are completely subordinated to Moldovan authorities and are accused by 
Tiraspol of receiving salary in foreign currency — Moldovan lei. The Dniestr 
region’s Education Minister Yelena Bomeshko stated that the Dniestr law permits 
education in any language, which fully applies to ethnic Moldovans. "We do not 
forbid children to study in the Romanian language. It is not a question of 
language, but that of the content of education that has to comply with the 
standards of the Dniestr region," she said. (9) She did not make any comments, 
however, about the unfairness of these standards (in order to register, Moldovan 
schools will have to give up Latin script). 
 
As a reaction to Transdniestr separatists closing Moldovan schools, Chisinau 
started blocking the movement of goods out of the breakaway region. Moldovan 
authorities said the economic sanctions would be lifted only when Transdniestr 
revokes its decision to close the schools. "This is not an economic blockade, we 
are simply restoring order in this country," stated Moldovan President Vladimir 
Voronin. The European Union also threatened economic sanctions on Friday 
against Transdniestr authorities. Javier Solana appealed to the Russian 
Federation to intervene with the Tiraspol authorities. (10) 
 
Leaders in the Dniestr region consider schools that teach in Moldovan as active 
supporters of Chisinau’s policies and thus sees these school as islands of 
potential rebellion. One thing is clear: There may not be a solution to the Dniestr 
problem for decades, and when the schoolchildren who are now barricaded in 
their schools grow up, they will surely remember that they were denied a basic 
right, to study in their mother tongue. 
 
UKRAINE 
A new political structure in support of Yanukovich 
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Twenty five political parties and 81 NGOs have united in support of the 
presidential candidate and current Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. The goal of 
this political structure, which might be named "Ukraine for Yanukovich," is to fight 
for Yanukovich’s honest victory in the upcoming presidential elections. (11) 
Yanukovich seems to be rather confident in his presidential victory and has, 
according to the announcement of the chief of his election team Sergei Tigipko, 
gathered over two million signatures in support of his candidacy (500,000 is the 
minimum requirement). Curiously enough, two days after the announcement, 
about 100 residents of Odessa picketed the city’s health directorate demanding a 
halt to a pressure on medical staff to sign and collect other signatures in support 
of Yanukovich. "Many medical staff members are being threatened with dismissal 
if they refuse to collect signatures…People are being misinformed, as they are 
told that they can give their support signatures only to one candidate. We are 
observing mass violation of the law 'On Ukrainian presidential elections,’" said 
the leader of the Civic Executive Committee. (12) Other violations of a similar 
kind were noted all over Ukraine. On 28 July, Yanukovich received a statement 
from the head of the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee for Freedom of Speech and 
Information, Mykola Tomenko, informing him of incidents deemed to violate 
freedom of speech. The statement said that Yanukovich’s government exerted 
pressure on the media. An example of "negotiations" with cable operators to 
remove Channel 5 from cable networks has been cited. (13) It seems that with 
his hands in every part of Ukrainian life, starting with hospitals and ending with 
the media, Yanukovich might have a good chance for a "victory" in the October 
election. 
 
Odessa-Brody pipeline to flow in the reverse direction 
Due to the absence of Western investors, Ukraine has decided to revise the 
Odessa-Brody pipeline — to transport Russian oil. The pipeline was constructed 
in 2002 and has the capacity to transport 14 million tons of oil per year, but it 
remains idle. There are plans to sign a deal with Russian oil companies. The 
decision might turn out to be permanent and will seal the fate of the pipeline, as 
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transport experts agree that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to reverse the flow 
of the pipeline — to transport Caspian Sea oil to Europe via the Black Sea. (14) 
 
Change in Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course? 
Leonid Kuchma has removed the goal of NATO and E.U. membership from the 
nation’s defense doctrine. The development has triggered a lot of speculation 
about the country’s Euro-Atlantic course. The defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk 
downplayed the significance of the development, however, saying that the 
doctrine is a medium term document, which reflects the reality of the next 10 
years. Marchuk referred to the statement of Romano Prodi, where he made it 
clear that Ukraine could not become an E.U. member in the next 10 years. As for 
NATO, during the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul, Ukraine received clear 
signals that relations between Ukraine and NATO were to remain at the same 
level in the near future. 
 
A tragic accident 
As a result of the explosion on 19 July in Krasnolimanskaya mine in Donetsk, 34 
miners died when a mixture of methane gas and coal-dust unexpectedly 
detonated. There were 48 miners underground when the explosion went off. 
Twelve of them escaped to the surface. (15) This is the country's deadliest mine 
explosion in two years. The opposition is demanding that the president dismiss 
Deputy Prime Minister for Fuel and Energy Andriy Klyuyev for not paying enough 
attention to the safety of miners. 
 
Ukraine is considered one of the deadliest places in the world to be a coal-miner. 
Since Ukraine’s independence in 2001, 3,700 miners lost their lives as a result of 
mine accidents. 75% of all mine pits are considered dangerous. A combination of 
old equipment, neglect for safety procedures and high concentration of methane 
gas makes death traps out of numerous mines in Ukraine. Many miners are so 
poor and eager to obtain at least some income that they disable their methane 
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gas detectors so that they are not stopped from working as a result of safety 
checks. (16) 
 
Source Notes: 
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(4) Agence France Press, 24 Jul 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Interfax news agency, 22 Jul 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Basapress news agency, 17 Jul 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging 
Markets. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
GEORGIA 
A new peacekeeping mandate needed in South Ossetia: 
Until recently, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has used country-wide 
anti-smuggling operations and social service rebuilding campaigns as a method 
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of slowly restoring Georgian control in South Ossetia. However, since the 
beginning of July the Georgian government has sought direct action to implement 
Saakashvili's political initiative that is intended to bring back secessionist South 
Ossetia as a part of Georgia, to "reclaim our territory, our Tskhinvali" as he 
recently told a Tel Aviv audience on a state visit to Israel (1). Under international 
law, as recognized by Russia in 1991, South Ossetia constitutes a part of 
Georgia's territorial integrity. 
 
Originally, Saakashvili tried to use the Joint Control Commission (JCC), the 
committee tasked with monitoring the situation in the conflict zone, as the 
platform for regaining a greater military and peacekeeping presence in South 
Ossetia. At the 14 July JCC meeting in Moscow, Georgian National Security 
Council Secretary, Gela Bezhuashvili, and Georgian Minister for Conflict 
Resolution, Giorgi Khaindrava, proposed total demilitarization of South Ossetia, 
joint monitoring of the Russian border and military cargoes by Russian and 
Georgian peacekeepers and withdrawal of the 2000 foreign mercenaries who 
have infiltrated South Ossetia. (2) The result of the meeting, which was planned 
originally to resolve the growing tensions between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, was an 
ambiguous protocol in which both Georgia and South Ossetia agreed "to take 
steps to ease the tensions" and withdraw all military forces, with the exception of 
peacekeepers, from the conflict zone. (3) However, the protocol did not 
incorporate the Georgian demand to be allowed to monitor all cargoes entering 
South Ossetia from Russia via the Roki tunnel. (4) The Georgian government 
has attempted to confiscate military shipments and convoys being sent illegally 
from Russia to South Ossetia. On 18 July, Georgian forces impounded a private 
car transporting an antitank gun and three shells near Tskhinvali and a car 
carrying the portable Fagot anti-tank system. (5) Despite Georgian watchfulness, 
Russia sent an additional 40 armored vehicles to predominantly Russian 
peacekeepers on 21 July, while claiming that the military shipments are part of 
the routine rotation of weapons and materials to South Ossetian and Russian 
peacekeepers. (6) 
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Georgian frustration with its inability to control the permeability of the South 
Ossetian-Russian border was communicated during Saakashvili's 20 July 
address to the Adjarian Supreme Council. Saakashvili informed legislators that 
he is ready to "withdraw from agreements" which prevent Georgia from "raising 
the national flag" in South Ossetia. (7) As Georgia senses itself stymied within 
the JCC, an organization dominated by Moscow, it has turned a hopeful eye on 
the OSCE to resolve the South Ossetian crisis. In the aftermath of the 26 July 
meeting of former Bulgarian president Zhelyu Zhelev with President Saakashvili 
and other Georgian Ministers, Giorgi Khaindrava expressed a desire for the 
OSCE to assume a broader and more active role in South Ossetia. (8) Russia 
opposes Georgia's quest for an enlarged OSCE contingent, and Moscow 
proceeded to take aim at the OSCE's role in the crisis. The Kremlin claimed that 
the OSCE was biased in favor of Georgia. (9) 
 
The OSCE has done little with its peacekeeping mandate thus far, except to call 
for resumption of a dialogue between South Ossetia and Georgia. (10) However, 
several instances in the past ten days have provided a break in tensions which 
could catalyze a renewal of exchanges between Tskhinvali and Tbilisi. On 24 
July Georgia returned to Russia 160 unguided missiles that were seized by 
Georgian Interior Ministry forces on 7 July. Seizure of the shipment, allegedly 
intended for Russian peacekeepers, prompted South Ossetian fighters to take 
roughly 38 Georgian peacekeepers hostage, all but 3 of whom have been 
released. (11) Additionally, the clash over peacekeeping troops has lately 
centered on Major General Svyatoslav Nabdzorov, the head of peacekeeping 
forces in South Ossetia. Georgia has an aggressive government and media 
campaign for Nabdzorov's removal, arguing that he had turned South Ossetia 
into a Russian fiefdom. Russia is replacing Nabdzorov in August with Maj. Gen. 
Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the 19th division stationed in South Ossetia. 
(12) 
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However, an exchange of small arms and heavy artillery fire between Georgian 
and South Ossetian troops on 30 July threatened to heighten tensions again. 
Both South Ossetian and Georgian officials denied starting the skirmish, which 
occurred outside the Georgian populated village of Tamarasheni. The South 
Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity, proceeded to charge Georgia with "aggression" 
while the commander of the Georgian peacekeeping contingent, Gini Gututsidze, 
stated that Georgian opened fire in retaliation after the South Ossetian side 
targeted Georgian civilians in Tamarsheni. (13) 
 
The Georgian Minister for Conflict Resolution Giorgi Khaindrava is insisting that 
Tbilisi does not intend to use force to restore its control over the breakaway 
republic of South Ossetia. (14) The Georgian government believes that the use 
of military force would damage Georgian's hopes of EU integration and 
jeopardize potential aid packages. 
 
Privatization plans arouse interest 
The announcement by Kakha Bendukidze of the privatization of Georgia's 
economy has given the Georgian political opposition fodder with which to attack 
Saakashvili's government as well as putatively providing Russia with greater 
access to Georgia's energy sector. 
 
On 22 July, the deputy chief of Russia's national power utility UES, Andrei 
Rappoport, held a meeting with Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, 
Economic Minister Bendukidze, and Fuel and Energy Minister Nika Gilauri. 
Rappoport said that UES wanted to see the privatization of Georgia's Inguri 
Hydro, the country's largest hydro power plant which accounts for 45% of 
Georgia's electricity production. (15) The significance of Rappoport statement, 
and the underlying Russian desire to control Georgia's energy supply, came into 
focus on 23 July when Gazprom halted gas supplies to Tbilgazi, the Georgian 
state gas company, forcing the shut-off of gas to four Tbilisi districts with 
outstanding gas bills. (16) 
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Although Moscow is pleased with the opening of the Georgian economy, some 
groups protested the new privatization plans. On 21 July, Georgian Interior 
Ministry Spetsnaz troops dispersed a protest involving about 75 persons outside 
the Economic Ministry. (17) Zviadists, supporters of the late Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, and followers of Georgia's Labor opposition party comprised the 
protesters. (18) After detaining three persons, including a 16 year-old boy, for 
their "outrageous and immoral" behavior, Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania tasked 
the State Security Ministry with determining who had organized the protests, 
adding that the organizers were embezzling Georgian national property as well. 
(19) Prime Minister Zhvania's protective stance towards Bendukidze and his new 
economic policy, underlined by his statement that "someone with complaints 
against Bendukidze is someone against the authorities, (20)" demonstrates the 
hope that Georgia's political elites place on Bendukidze's ability to resurrect the 
country's economy. Prime Minister Zhvania's aggressive use of state security 
facilities to investigate and control protests also displays a worrying tendency 
within the new Georgian political establishment to use force when confronted. 
 
ARMENIA 
Armenia strives to move outside the box 
On 20 July, Iran began constructing its part of a gas-pipeline to export Iranian 
gas to Armenia. The developing Iranian-Armenian ties offer Armenia an 
alternative ally to Russia while also giving the land-locked country a physical 
outlet to the world. 
 
The deepening ties between them seem to have disturbed Moscow more than 
Washington, lending credence to speculation to the effect that the two powers 
have divided the Caucasus into zones of interests, with the US taking Georgia 
and leaving Armenia to Russia. Thus far, the sole statement on the situation by 
the US Ambassador to Armenia, John Ordway, revealed little real concern over 
an Armenian-Iranian political link, but rather focused on denying that the US 
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embassy had engaged in any anti-Iranian activity in the past two weeks. (21) In 
contrast, during a meeting with Chairman of Iran's Supreme National Security 
Council, Hasan Roukhani, the Secretary of Russia's Security Council, Igor 
Ivanov, stated that pipelines from Iran to Armenia are the "most important 
strategic projects in the region." (22) Indeed, on 19 July, the Vice-Chairman of 
the national Russian gas company, Gazprom, Aleksander Ryazanov, that the 
construction of the Armenian side of the gas-pipeline will be partially funded with 
the aid of the Russian government or Gazprom. (23) 
 
CHECHNYA 
Another day, another election 
On 22 July, an election official of Chechnya's pro-Moscow administration formally 
rejected the registration of Malik Saidullaev as a candidate in the republic's 
presidential election scheduled for the end of August. (24) The pro-Moscow 
authorities thus removed from contention the one serious competitor to the 
Kremlin-backed candidate, Alu Alkhanov. 
 
The Secretary of the CEC (Chechen Election Committee), Ela Vakhitov, stated 
that reason behind excluding Saidullaev from the presidential race was that his 
passport was ruled invalid. (25) However, as the journalist Anna Politkovskaya 
observed, it is "strange" that the election officials did not note this "irregularity" 
when Saidullaev filed as a candidate for the republic's presidential election last 
autumn. In Politkovskaya's opinion the exclusion of Saidullaev is only "one step 
from the horrible to the ridiculous," especially when it is noted that the passport 
was issued by the Balashinkhinsky Internal Affairs Directorate of the Moscow 
Oblast, which is an official state agency. (26) 
 
Following the CEC's decision, Saidullaev stated that the Chechen election 
authorities had been obeying "an order from the Kremlin," while adding that he 
still plans to run again for president of an "independent Chechnya." (27) In an 
interview with the Associated Press, Saidullaev stressed that Moscow's decision 
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has further delegitimized the August 29 presidential election, while giving 
Maskhadov increased credibility, adding that Putin will have to deal with 
Maskhadov at some point. (28) 
 
The Chechen Election Commission also rejected candidate applicants Yaragi 
Mamodaev, Adam Edilov, and Zura Magomadova, most likely as a tactic to make 
Saidullaev's exclusion seem less arbitrary. Only six other candidates remain to 
give the presidential election a semblance of genuine competition: Umar Abuev, 
Magomed Aidomirov, Mukhmud-Khasan Asakov, Abdul Bugaev, Movsar 
Khamidov and Vakha Visaev. (29) In an article, Politkovskaya described Abuev, 
Aidamirov, Asakov, and Visaev as "simply doubles" for Alkhanov who will barely 
campaign themselves. Khamidov, a veteran FSB officer, will promote his 
candidacy, but she predicts that he will not exert any influence over the outcome 
of the election since the FSB is taking its lead from Putin and supporting 
Alkhanov. (30) 
 
The putative outcome of the August 29 Chechen presidential election has been 
invalidated further by a recent International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 
report cautioning the Russian government against holding elections in such an 
opaque political environment. (31) The Executive Director of the IHF, Aaron 
Rhodes, added that the Russian authorities are "apparently not interested in 
running a free and fair ballot in Chechnya" but rather are seeking to "railroad" the 
election of a favored candidate in a one-person race. According to the IHF and 
the Moscow Helsinki Group, the minimal conditions for the holding of free and fair 
elections in Chechnya must include: A recognized cessation of hostilities by both 
sides to the conflict; a plurality of candidates; free operation of the media, 
guaranteed exercise of freedom of expression by all and the agreement of the 
international community, including the OSCE and the Council of Europe, to send 
observers (32). 
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It is highly unlikely that the IHF's suggestions will be met by any real 
consideration, since Russia has done everything in its power to prevent them 
from being implemented. Thus, the August 29 Chechen presidential elections will 
yield yet another Moscow supported strong-man who will perpetuate the cycle of 
violence. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Suicide bombings in Uzbekistan; Human Rights and elections in 
Kazakhstan 
On 30 July 2004, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, three suicide bombers attacked the 
U.S. Embassy, the Israeli Embassy, and the Uzbek prosecutor-general’s office. 
The bombings came four days after the start of the trial for fifteen accused of 
being connected with the 28 March-1 April bombings in Uzbekistan. (1) It seems 
plausible that the late March violence in Uzbekistan was related to popular 
dissatisfaction with widespread human rights abuses and religious persecution 
and equally plausible that the recent bombings are an attempt to connect the 
oppressive nature of Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s government to the support 
it receives from both the United States and Israel. How this will affect the region 
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as a whole immediately remains to be seen, but as Kazakhstan prepares for 
parliamentary elections scheduled for 19 September, the issue of human rights is 
gaining importance in the campaigns of opposition candidates. 
 
Suicide bombings in Uzbekistan 
Three separate suicide bombs were detonated in afternoon attacks in Tashkent, 
claiming the lives of at least three, in addition to the attackers, and injuring at 
least nine others. Two Uzbek security guards were killed in the bombing at the 
Israeli Embassy and a third individual was killed at the prosecutor-general’s 
office. There were no fatalities at the U.S. Embassy though two Uzbeks were 
injured in that blast. In a statement made on an Al-Qaeda linked website, a 
previously unknown group, calling itself the Islamic Jihad Group in Uzbekistan 
(IJG), claimed responsibility. (2) 
 
At this point, the motives for the bombings are unclear, but they do coincide with 
the ongoing trial of those accused of participating in the March 2004 bombing. 
Ranging in age from 22 to 40, 13 men and two women are being tried before the 
Uzbek Supreme Court, charged under 17 articles of the Uzbek criminal code, 
including: "terrorism, religious extremism, attempting to change the constitutional 
system of the country by violent methods, creating well-established organized 
crime groups, disseminating banned literature that is against the state system of 
Uzbekistan, and attempting to set up an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia." (3) 
 
The 15 defendants allegedly were members of Jamoat, an extremist cell believed 
to be connected with Al-Qaeda. (4) At the time of the attacks, it was claimed that 
the terrorists received training in South Waziristan, Pakistan, where Deputy 
Prosecutor Murod Solihov alleges that the defendants learned bomb making 
skills. The attackers are believed to have gathered in South Waziristan from 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran and Pakistan. (5) The relationship between Jamoat 
and IJG is not yet known, but it is assumed that members of both groups 
received similar training outside of Uzbekistan. It is further assumed that 
 37 
Karimov’s disregard for human rights and his continued pressure on religious 
conservatives was at least one of the reasons for the attacks. 
 
Human Rights 
Since the tragedies of 11 September 2001, Uzbekistan has become a strategic 
ally of the U.S., supporting the U.S.-led military offensive in Afghanistan and 
continuing its aggressive crackdown on Islamic extremists. Serving as host to a 
U.S. military air base and important in the "fight against terrorism," Uzbekistan 
seemed (temporarily, at least) immune from criticism on human rights abuses. In 
mid-July, however, the U.S. State Department informed the Uzbek government 
that because of its failure to meet the terms of the 2002 Strategic Partnership 
Framework agreement (SPF), up to $18 million in military and economic aid for 
the year 2004, would be withheld until further progress is made on the human 
rights and democracy fronts. (6) While the U.S. attempted to strike a conciliatory 
tone claiming that there had been "encouraging progress over the past year" in 
the sphere of human rights, the authoritative nature of the Karimov government 
made it difficult for the U.S. State Department to certify the SPF, which mandates 
"substantial and continuing progress" towards democratization. (7) 
 
Uzbekistan has been especially draconian in addressing what are perceived as 
Islamic activists wanting reform in the state; Human Rights Watch estimates that 
over 7,000 Muslims have been improperly imprisoned. (8) Uzbek prisons are 
notorious for a disregard of prisoners' rights and while such concerns have 
largely been the focus of human rights groups rather than government officials; in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan the issue of prisoners' rights is being discussed in 
the public sphere. In Kyrgyzstan, Ombudsman Tursunbay Bakir uulu reported 
that female prisoners in correctional colony No. 2 (in Stepnoy) and remand 
center No. 1 (in Bishkek) had been sexually harassed and raped. (9) 
 
In Kazakhstan, the issue of prisoners' rights has become even more public. In 
Arkalyk (in the northern Kostanay Region), four former wardens were convicted 
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of beating prisoners and sentenced to between five and six years in prison. (10) 
One prison, correctional institution GM 172/7, is being closed due to an 
investigation which made public its inhumane living conditions (11) and human 
rights activists claim that human rights violations are on the rise in Kazakhstani 
courts and among police. (12) The issue of prisoners' rights has become so well 
recognized that some opposition politicians have suggested the formation of a 
special committee for the protection of prisoners’ rights. (13) 
 
Preparing for Elections in Kazakhstan 
Part of the platform of Kazakh opposition parties concerns human rights, as 
affecting the rights of prisoners. What is likely to continue to dominate local 
media sources until the 19 September 2004 parliamentary elections are the 
political parties in Kazakhstan, as they select candidates and organize in hopes 
of gaining power. Many of the parties — including Ruhaniyat, Asar, Party of 
Patriots for Kazakhstan (PPK), Aul Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, Civic 
Party of Kazakhstan, and the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan — have 
submitted their party lists and selected and endorsed their candidates for the 
September elections. (14) Opposition parties have expressed their willingness to 
cooperate whereas pro-presidential parties such as Asar — headed by the 
president’s daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva — are seen as having the clear 
advantage in the upcoming elections. (15) Nonetheless, Kazakh President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev has asked influential business tycoons to stay out of the 
political debates and called for fair elections, which would allow equitable media 
presentation of information about political parties and candidates. (16) 
 
Elsewhere, the Uzbek Central Electoral Commission has set 26 December 2004 
as the date for parliamentary elections. (17) Tajikistan’s Islamic Rebirth Party has 
criticized the country’s new election laws which it sees as preventing 80 percent 
of the population from serving in elected positions. (18) And while Kyrgyz 
President Askar Akayev insists that he is not running for re-election, the leading 
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opposition figure, Felix Kulov, is slated to remain in jail until after the 2005 
presidential elections. (19) 
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